At Chemed Corporation, investors delivered a decisive rejection of the remuneration report, while Shell allowed shareholders to vote on a climate proposal that BP had excluded from its own ballot. Elsewhere, state ownership at Equinor and entrenched supermajority requirements at OGE Energy again limited the practical impact of majority support for reform.

Together, these meetings show that while investors remain willing to challenge boards, ownership structures, ballot access and voting mechanics determine what change is achievable in practice.

THIS WEEK'S KEY VOTES

Remuneration Dissent

Chemed Corporation’s remuneration report was voted down at its AGM on 18/05/2026, receiving only around 36% support, down from 85% in 2025. Other companies to face significant shareholder dissent on remuneration recently include US-based Akamai Technologies Inc (~42% on LTIP), Germany’s K&S AG (~42% on policy), the UK’s Vistry Group plc (~37% on report and policy), and Switzerland’s Temenos AG (~34% on report).

Climate Proposals

Shell plc held its AGM on 19/05/2026, where shareholders voted on a proposal coordinated by Follow This seeking reporting on Shell’s strategy under declining demand for oil and gas. The proposal received around 13% support. Shell’s decision to allow a vote contrasted with BP, whose board excluded the same resolution last month. That triggered investor backlash, including around 20% dissent on the re-election of BP’s chair and the defeat of proposals to revoke previously successful climate-related shareholder proposals and to permit virtual-only meetings. At Shell’s AGM, its new remuneration policy received 95% support, which included an increase in the CEO’s long-term incentive opportunity from 600% to 900% of salary.

Equinor ASA held its AGM on 12/05/2026, where Follow This filed the same proposal. The proposal received around 4% support, while a further six shareholder proposals receiving between 0.1% and 3%. These low support levels largely reflect the Norwegian state’s 67% voting stake. Follow This said that, excluding the controlling shareholder, its proposal received 21% support from independent shareholders.

Supermajority Voting Provisions Hold Back Reform Again

A shareholder proposal filed by John Chevedden at OGE Energy’s 2026 AGM calling for a simple-majority voting standard received majority support. The same proposal had also won majority backing in 2012, 2015, 2019, 2021 and 2024. In the following years (2013, 2016, 2020, 2022 and 2025) the board proposed bylaw amendments to remove the supermajority provisions, but each fell short of the required 80% approval from shareholders of record. These results illustrates how supermajority provisions can entrench themselves, preventing reform even when a majority supports it.

Shareholder Rights Proposals

At TransUnion, a shareholder proposal filed by John Chevedden seeking a 10% threshold for shareholders to call special meetings received majority support. At Wyndham Hotels & Resorts Inc, a proposal filed by The Accountability Board to allow shareholders to act by written consent also passed. These votes continue the broader trend of governance proposals attracting meaningful support, while many social and environmental proposals continue to struggle.

WHAT TO WATCH NEXT WEEK

Exxon

Exxon Mobil Corp’s AGM on 27/05/2026 has been attracting significant interest across the shareholder landscape, primarily centred around resolutions 4 and 6.

Resolution 4 has been proposed by the company’s management as it looks to redomicile the company from a corporation under Jersey laws to a corporation organised under Texas law. Exxon has stated that the move to Texas is a governance alignment decision and it should ensure improved legal clarity, while also continuing to maintain existing shareholder protections. However, this move has led to investor debate as many investors believe that the jurisdictional changes could affect Exxon’s future balance of shareholder rights and corporate accountability.

Resolution 6 is a shareholder proposal filed by the New York City Comptroller (NYCC). The proposal directly challenges the structure of Exxon’s voting; the NYCC argue that retail voting currently favours board recommendations and therefore they have submitted a proposal which seeks to give retail shareholders greater flexibility to vote separately from management recommendations.

A separate filing has also been made by the New York City Comptroller. The filing recommends Exxon shareholders vote against resolution 4 and vote in favour of resolution 6. For resolution 4, the NYCC has raised concerns that a move to Texas could result in changes to the company’s governance framework over time as they note there is a difference in state-level corporate law. Moreover, the filing also highlights concerns around the implications of the proposal for shareholder rights and governance arrangements. For resolution 6, the filing supports the proposal on the basis that Exxon’s current retail voting may overly support board recommendations.

Minerva notes that Exxon replied with a formal response to the NYCC, rejecting both of their statements. Exxon claims that the redomiciliation proposal and retail voting are not linked and that both are designed to operate independently. Furthermore, Exxon believes that the Texas redomiciliation would align Exxon’s structure more closely with its business operations. Additionally, they note that the retail voting programme is positioned as a voluntary mechanism aimed at increasing shareholder participation without affecting shareholders’ ability to exercise voting choice.

Meta Platforms

One of the standout meetings from the upcoming week is that of Meta Platforms, with nine shareholder proposals on the agenda. These include three governance proposals, with two relating to the company’s multiple voting structure. The Illinois State Treasurer has filed for the disclosure of disaggregated voting results, and NorthStar Asset Management has requested the elimination of the dual-class structure, with the latter of significant focus as Meta does not currently have time-based sunset provisions, demonstrating a notable misalignment from the Council of Institutional Investors recommendations and accepted corporate governance standards. Additionally, John Chevedden has requested the adoption of annual advisory Say-on-Pay votes, as Meta currently holds its Say-on-Pay votes every three years. These proposals are considered to be in-line with good practice and would aid in boosting shareholder rights and corporate accountability.

On the other hand, we can also see a number of ESG-related proposals up for shareholder vote. The National Center for Public Policy Research has filed an anti-ESG proposal, requesting a report on the risks of discrimination from H-1B visa programme usage. These non-immigrant visas allow companies to employ foreign workers temporarily in specialist subjects such as IT and engineering, exacerbated by the rise in AI technology. With immigration continuing to be a hotly contested issue both in US and global politics, an anti-ESG proposal of this nature, that posits visa sponsorship programmes as detrimental to the company or discriminatory in nature may not come as a shock, although Minerva expects a proposal of this nature to receive very few votes in favour, as such anti-ESG proposals usually do.

Other proposals come from Mercy Investment Services, Proxy Impact, As You Sow, JLens, and Azzad Asset Management. These focus on a variety of topics, namely: data protection assessments of generative AI chatbots; the integration of child safety metrics in executive remuneration programmes; a climate change-related commitment report; a report on addressing online hate speech, and a human rights due diligence assessment. These resolutions highlight the continuing anxiety surrounding AI usage and the safety of online platforms, as well as sustainability and the ongoing pressure on companies to ensure effective environmental protections and adherence to climate change frameworks.

The issue that will impede the success of any of these proposals, particularly the resolution to eliminate the dual-class structure, is that CEO and Chairman Mark Zuckerberg is a controlling shareholder of Meta Platforms, holding over 60% of the voting power. It is unlikely that a controlling shareholder will vote for a proposal to eliminate the very structure that makes him the controlling shareholder, and thus he maintains the deciding vote on these proposals, limiting the ability of shareholders to enact change at annual meetings.

‍According to Minerva’s data, the number of shareholder proposals is set to fall sharply next week, dropping from 71 this week to just 29. That shift suggests the busiest part of the US proxy season is now behind us, with proposal volumes likely to continue easing over the coming weeks.